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Bureaucracy: a Term and Concept in the Socialist 
Discourse about State Power (Before 1941)
DARKO SUVIN*
Summary
The term and concept of bureaucracy is discussed as found in the debates of 
Marx, Engels, and the German Social-democratic Party, then in Lenin’s Fight 
against Bureaucracy and the State Machine, and finally in Stalin’s Unavowed 
Thermidor (these are the subtitles). It is concerned only with “upstream of Yu-
goslavia”, i.e. what the Communist parties had accepted or at least known of 
in the 1930s, and the CPY started modifying after 1948. All outside of such a 
vulgate (Weber, Trotsky, and so on) is not discussed. 
Keywords: bureaucracy, State, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, German Social-
-democratic party before World War I
The philosopher [Wittgenstein] speaks no other language but the 
one he finds in his cognitive object. 
Gunter Gebauer
Introduction 
This essay is part of a discussion focusing on historical semantic lineaments of the 
term and concept “bureaucracy”, and its epistemological implications, in the 19th 
Century socialist movement and the two paradigmatic European socialist States, 
Russia and Yugoslavia. My aim in this first essay is modest: to provide the back-
ground and premises indispensable for understanding, in a second essay, the dis-
course about bureaucracy and State power in post-revolutionary Yugoslavia. This 
aim excludes an exhaustive account of this theme in the 19th Century or in revolu-
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tionary Russia, as well as a critical account of the strengths and weaknesses of these 
semantic usages (which shall be dealt with in the following essay on Yugoslav dis-
course). I wish only to delineate a discursive universe which will be used after 1945 
both by the Party/State and the oppositional discourse in SFR Yugoslavia. 
This essay starts from the premise that Lenin and his Bolshevik party col-
laborators inherited the term of bureaucracy from the tradition represented on the 
one hand by Marx and Engels, and on the other hand the experience of the Second 
International and its main pillar, the German Social-democratic party. They fused 
it with the experiences of the tsarist officialdom and ranking system (činovniki), 
whose key executive role Lenin excoriated from his beginnings (for example in the 
polemic with Struve, 1894). In all of his programmatic writings about the Russian 
social-democratic party, he insisted that all public functionaries must be elected and 
recallable; when Lenin wrote against the Kerensky government before the October 
revolution, he blamed its “reactionary bureaucratic ways” (IP: 81) which harked 
back to the old regime. I cannot here do justice to this important Russian context. 
The essay deals only with the Marx-to-Lenin tradition in the socialist and then com-
munist movements and its perversion by Stalinism in the USSR.
“Bureaucracy” was from Marx to Lenin used in the discourse about (always 
class-derived) State power and its revolutionary replacement. In the USSR after 
Lenin it began to mean, confusingly, both a subordinate part of the State totality and 
a pars pro toto for it; while under Stalin it principally came to mean what impeded 
the centralization, expansion, and smooth work of the hierarchical State machinery, 
with perhaps a demagogic hint to the workers and peasants that the Powers That Be 
were their allies against this oppressive excrescence. In Yugoslavia it advanced to 
the privileged key-word for an apparatus standing above civil society and implying 
a separate social group (possibly class), in the discourse criticizing or indeed op-
posing socialist State power. It represented there the emergence of the understand-
ing that in absolutism and capitalism the bureaucracy was, together with the army, 
an important part of the ruling class hierarchy; however, after the communist revo-
lutions (which annihilated the other functions of the ruling hierarchy), the bureau-
cracy – the army was not considered further – became the whole of the hierarchy. In 
the USSR and Yugoslavia, it came to stand for the banished discourse about a new, 
Thermidorean ruling class. 
As to “socialism”, disregarding my reservations about the term when used as a 
historical epoch,1 I shall use it here to cover the political movement loosely organi-
1 Suvin, “Marksizam: nauka ili komunizam?” “Aktiv br. 2”, Novosti [Zagreb] of 26 November 
2010, p. 3, www.novossti.com/2010/11/marksizam-nauka-ili-komunizam/. 
I write State as état with a capital letter, to differentiate it from state as condition, and “soviet” 
when referring to the various local councils and their system, but “Soviet” when referring to the 
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zed in the Second International as well as the power constellations in the USSR dur-
ing its formative period, roughly from 1917 to 1929 (and in the second essay, the 
power constellations in the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, roughly from 1945 
to the early 1970s). 
I am aware that this endeavour is a kind of archaeological excavation into dis-
courses and semantics (with very practical equivalents in social life), certain ver-
sions of which were familiar in “socialist” States, and are therefore well-known to 
specialists of those spacetimes, but are quite buried under the rubble of intervening 
events for most, including those who would wish to look at them anew. It cannot 
pretend to originality, but only to helpfulness. I have decided to run the risk of un-
necessary repetition rather than of omission of relevant matters and texts. 
I shall avoid confrontation with the non-Marxist discourse on bureaucracy – by 
the ineffable Spencer and scores of anti-socialist polemicists during the rise of the 
German and French Social-Democratic parties (for the latter, see Angenot, 1993: 
65-67), then Weber, Michels, Merton, and so on – until it might naturally arise, in a 
following essay, through its repercussions in SFR Yugoslavia. Certainly up to then 
the militant tradition of Lenin’s successors (including the pioneering Trotsky, who 
is here also not represented) had no time or money to enter into substantial confron-
tations with that discourse. This was understandable in view of their overriding ne-
cessities and of the fact that they had some once excellent tools. But after the 1920s, 
and especially the 1940s, this exclusive concentration turned sectarian, and the ra-
pidly changing times demanded a much refurbished toolbox. 
1. Marx, Engels, and the German Social-democratic Party as Sources
Bureaucracy was always considered by Marx as a mainstay of the State system, and 
in particular of the one begun in Absolutism and maturing after the French Revolu-
tion, when capitalism needed a powerful State, even at the price of strong monar-
chic and even landowning elements – as in Germany and the U.K. The role of bu-
USSR. Disliking “God words”, I write “party”, “communist”, and “revolution” in lower case, 
except for quotes and specific cases such as “October Revolution” or “Bolshevik Party”. “CP” 
means “communist party”, which was in the USSR at the beginning called “Russian (and later 
the All-Federal) Communist Party (bolshevik)”, acronym VKP(b), in Yugoslavia translated as 
SKP(b). 
In section 2 I draw heavily on Lenin’s Collected Works in English, where possible checked 
against his Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5th edn., on his Izbrannye proizvedeniia, and on Bettel-
heim (though I disagree with his insufficient dichotomy between bourgeoisie and proletariat in 
socialism); they are cited as CW, IP, and B. 
My thanks for much help with materials is due to Inter-Library Loans Dept. of McGill Uni-
versity, its English Dept. and Valentina Matsangos, and my long-time and constant friend Marc 
Angenot.
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reaucracy depended thus on one’s views about the State, which in Marx crystallized 
after the Paris Commune of 1871.2
However, from his earliest Notes for a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right 
he identified the central characteristic of bureaucracy as “founded on [the] separa-
tion [of the State and civil society]”. Further, “The general spirit of the bureaucracy 
is the secret, the mystery, preserved within it by means of the hierarchy and exter-
nally as a closed corporation. To make public the mind and the disposition of the 
State appears therefore to the bureaucracy as a betrayal of its mystery. Accordingly, 
authority is the principle of its knowledge and being, and the deification of autho-
rity is its mentality” (WAMW/1843/critique-hpr/ch03.htm). Bureaucracy is “an es-
tate in the medieval sense..., where civil and political positions are immediately 
identical” (WAMW/1843/critique-hpr/ch05.htm). Hegel’s “civil society” (bürger-
liche Gesellschaft) as private economic life is in Marx inverted as the presupposi-
tion for the State, and in The Jewish Question evolves to stand for the economic and 
ideological aspects below the political State (Tucker, ed.: 33), or below the power 
structure of the ruling class. Marx treats both as alienations of human possibilities: 
the State is an empty idealism of societal unity, civil society a petty materialism of 
individualist egotism (ibidem: 32, 40-42, and in the 10th Thesis on Feuerbach, 109). 
Focusing on politics and then economics, at least since 1847-1848 Marx and En-
gels always write about “the army and the bureaucracy” as pillars of the State. And 
in chapter 7 of The 18th Brumaire we find a first sketch of both the history and the 
function of bureaucracy in a modern autocratic State. As to history: 
This executive power with its enormous bureaucratic and military organization, 
with its wide-ranging and ingenious state machinery, with a host of officials num-
bering half a million, besides an army of another half million – this appalling para-
sitic growth which enmeshes the body of French society and chokes all its pores 
sprang up in the time of the absolute monarchy...
Then the French Revolution, Napoleon, and all successive governments ad-
ded and strengthened it: “All revolutions perfected this [State] machine instead of 
breaking it”. This diagnosis was to be repeated and brought to a head in The Civil 
War in France.
As to social role:
2 I cite the internet texts on www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/ as WAMW, and the 1972 
Marx-Engels Reader as Tucker, ed. Italics in all citations are by the original author, unless oth-
erwise stated. In view of the sometimes differing and often anonymous translations of Marx into 
English, I have checked all with the German text and tacitly emended some translations, espe-
cially from WAMW.
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An enormous bureaucracy, well gallooned and well fed, is the ‘Napoleonic idea’ 
which is most congenial to the second Bonaparte. How could it be otherwise, con-
sidering that alongside the actual classes of society, he is forced to create an arti-
ficial caste for which the maintenance of his regime becomes a bread-and-butter 
question? Hence one of his first financial operations was the raising of officials’ 
salaries to their old level and the creation of new sinecures. (WAMW/1852/18th-
brumaire/ch07.htm; Tucker, ed.: 514 and 520) 
Bureaucracy is here something approximating a separate class, though not 
founded on economy but on politics, and therefore somewhat curtly called “an arti-
ficial caste”. Marx is here backgrounding the point which was to worry communist 
heretics from the time of Trotsky to that of the Praxis writers: just how is bureau-
cracy situated in the class system? 
I shall further confine myself to two key texts which were to be cited again and 
again in debates within socialist countries about their economic system and State 
apparatus: Marx’s admiring analysis of the Paris Commune in 1871 and his critique 
of the German Social-democratic Party four years later. Engels’s work in the Anti-
-Dühring and elsewhere is almost equally important, but will be discussed through 
his influence on Lenin. 
Chapter 3 in The Civil War in France describes the workings of the Paris Com-
mune. It wanted “to abolish that class property which transforms the labour of the 
many into the wealth of the few. It aimed at the expropriation of the expropriators. 
It wanted to make individual property a truth by transforming the means of produc-
tion, land and capital, now chiefly the means of enslaving and exploiting labour, 
into mere instruments of free and associated labour” (Tucker, ed.: 557). The Com-
mune substituted the “armed people” for the standing army and “revocable agent[s] 
of the Commune... serv[ing] at workmen’s wages” for a closed civil-service group 
administering public affairs (ibidem: 554). The horizon was: “While the merely re-
pressive organs of the old governmental power were to be amputated, its legitimate 
functions were to be wrested from an authority claiming pre-eminence over society 
itself... The Commune type of constitution would have restored to the social body 
all the forces hitherto absorbed by the parasitic excrescence of ‘State’, feeding upon 
and clogging the free movement of society” (ibidem: 555-556). And further, quite 
prophetically for socialist States: 
[The Commune] was essentially a working-class government, the result of the 
struggle of the creating against the appropriating class, the finally discovered poli-
tical form under which to work out the economic emancipation of labour. // With-
out this last condition, the Commune type of constitution would have been an im-
possibility and a delusion. The political rule of the producer cannot coexist with the 
perpetuation of his social slavery... With labour emancipated, every man becomes a 
labourer, and productive labour ceases to be a class attribute. (ibidem: 557) 
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The marginal glosses to the program of the German Workers’ Party, translat-
ed as the Critique of the Gotha Programme and for a long time forgotten, were 
popularized mainly by Lenin’s State and Revolution, but deserve to be treated on 
their own. I shall bracket out here the discussion of economic aspects of the future 
“emancipation of labour”, immensely influential for example in Yugoslavia, and 
focus on his famous division of post-capitalist society and its road toward commu-
nism into two phases. The first phase is “a communist society... just as it emerges 
from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally, and 
intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb 
it emerges. Accordingly, the individual producer receives back from society – after 
the deductions [for the common funds] have been made – exactly what he gives to 
it” (ibidem: 386-387). What obtains is still regulated by an “exchange of equal va-
lues”, that is, this phase is subject to an ideal “bourgeois right” (Recht means right, 
law, and even jurisprudence): 
[T]his equal right is still burdened by a bourgeois limitation. The... equality con-
sists in the fact that measurement is made with an equal standard, labour... This 
equal right is an unequal right for unequal labour... it tacitly recognises unequal 
individual endowment and thus performance capacity as natural privileges. It is, 
therefore, a right of inequality in its content, like every right. // [T]hese defects 
are inevitable in the first phase of communist society... Right can never be higher 
than the economic structuring and its entailed cultural development of society. 
(ibidem: 387)
In a second, “higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordi-
nation of the individual to the division of labour... has vanished... – only then can 
the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be entirely overstepped and society inscribe 
on its banner: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!” 
(ibidem: 388).
In this perspective it is then possible to ask what transformation will the State 
undergo in communist society. Marx’s even more famous answer is that between 
capitalism and full communism, in a “political transition period” corresponding to 
“the period of revolutionary transformation of the one into the other”, the State in 
the sense of a specialized ruling apparatus “can be nothing but the revolutionary 
dictatorship of the proletariat” (ibidem: 395 and 396).3
3 I cannot enter here into the semantic confusions occasioned by the Roman term “dictatorship”, 
possibly larger than even for “proletariat”, except to say that Lenin from his earliest writings on 
(say, Two Tactics) always explained it as Marx’s dictatorship of a whole class, and not of a party 
or smaller group; see Draper and Balibar. True, having lost the core of the working class in the 
Civil War epoch, he fell back on the communist party as a temporary expedient. This imposed 
necessity became the precondition for, but cannot justify, Stalin’s autocracy. For Lenin’s horizon, 
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Finally, the theoretical toolbox of Bolshevism and Lenin himself was in good 
part inherited from the Second International (cf. both books by Lih). Though har-
bouring a spread of attitudes, its parties came to be modelled on bourgeois parties 
and eventually got to be strongly institutionalized, that is, bureaucratized. Its pillar, 
the German Social-democratic Party, practiced a from top down relationship of the 
leadership to the lower echelons, whose local secretaries and other organizers were 
in great part appointed by and paid from the central instances. In 1907, the party’s 
apparatus comprised 20,000 people, and the number was rising (in the Weimar Re-
public, it grew to between 100,000 and 300,000 paid functionaries, of which 7,500 
were paid about triple the income of a small entrepreneur or the salary of a high 
German State functionary) – Bricianer (1969: 123). Little democratic centralism 
remained, it was becoming centralism tout court, so that Lenin’s recipe of the time 
even for the illegal organization to fight tsarism was considerably more democratic 
(the practice under the Russian police onslaught limped behind). 
It should also be noted that Lenin unreservedly admired the efficiency of the 
“Prussian” (German) bureaucracy and State organisation, especially the post of-
fice and railways, but then also the wartime centralization of all economic life, and 
wished for such a “culture” in the USSR as the basis of socialism (see, among many 
examples, IP: 159 and 432).4
2. Lenin’s Fight against Bureaucracy and the State Machine 
My thesis is that “two lines” coexisted in the USSR views on bureaucracy and the 
State machine up to Stalin’s triumph: a call for radical proletarian democracy from 
below, with Marx’s final horizon of a non-State association of communes without a 
permanent army and bureaucracy, and a call for strong centralized State apparatus, 
due in Lenin’s time to the pressing needs of the revolution’s survival and later used 
to justify full dictatorship by a small group in the Party-State personal union. Add-
ing to the Maoist parlance the Blochian one (1959, I: 240-42), we can also call them 
the warm and the cold streams within Soviet theory and practice. 
Paradoxically, both of them have had their strongest as well as most intelligent 
and articulated defender in Lenin, in different periods. Leaving aside his work be-
fore World War I (his supposed mania for centralization of the underground party 
has been misinterpreted by kremlinologists eager to establish a full continuity be-
tween him and Stalin; see their demolition in Lih, 2006), the two periods are 1915-
-1917 and 1918 to end (practically 1922). To anticipate, I believe his heart was in 
Gramsci’s better term of “hegemony” is at hand, and in fact Lenin occasionally used its synonym 
glavenstvo (B 1: 127). 
4 His other paragon was the US technology, trust organization, and educational system.
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the full democracy of the Soviets on the model of the Commune, but as a statesman 
whose overriding aim was to save revolutionary power in the unprecedented Civil 
War and total economic and biopolitical catastrophe, he had to retreat to what he 
in the NEP debate called the “commanding heights” of State power. The immedi-
ate task of avoiding the fate of the Paris Commune had to take precedence over the 
final horizon. 
2.1. The Theory of Revolution, 1915-1917
Lenin took to heart Marx’s (and then Engels’s) lessons learned from the Commune 
of Paris. He did not know of Marx’s early philosophical writings or the Grundrisse, 
but in The State and Revolution of 1917 he analyzed, while in the underground hid-
ing from the Kerensky government, their accessible documents, including letters, 
most thoroughly and on the whole fairly, though interpreting (as his subtitle shows) 
the “Marxist Teaching on the State” with fierce concentration on “The Tasks of the 
Proletariat in the [Impending] Revolution”: the strength, and no doubt limitation, 
of Lenin’s theorizing is that it was for him always a phase of practice. He placed 
his readings into the overwhelming context of the monstrous growth of imperial-
ist armed forces, as evident in World War I just going on, which were realizing En-
gels’s warning that they could “devour the whole of society and even the State” (IP: 
132). The only way out was for him a violent revolution superseding such a State. 
From this vantage point, he cited the conclusion of Engels’s Origin of the Family, 
Private Property, and the State: 
The State is therefore... a product of society at a particular stage of development; 
it is the admission that this society has involved itself in insoluble self-contradic-
tion and is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to exorcise. 
But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests, 
shall not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, a power, apparently 
standing above society, has become necessary to moderate the conflict and keep it 
within the bounds of >order<; and this power, arisen out of society, but placing it-
self above it and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the State. (WAMW/1884/
origin-family/ch09.htm)
His somewhat one-sided gloss runs: “The State arises when, where, and to 
the extent that class antagonisms objectively cannot be reconciled. And conversely, 
the existence of the State proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable” (IP: 
129). And further, “the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible... without the 
destruction of the apparatus of State power which was created by the ruling class 
and which is the embodiment of this ‘alienation’” (IP: 130). 
Two further specifications in Engels’s argument, indicated by Lenin, are: 
Suvin, D., Bureaucracy: a Term and Concept in the Socialist Discourse about State Power...
201
[The State]... is normally the State of the most powerful, economically ruling class, 
which by its means becomes also the politically ruling class, and so acquires new 
means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class... The... modern repre-
sentative State is the instrument for exploiting wage-labor by capital. Exceptional 
periods, however, occur when the warring classes are so nearly equal in forces 
that the State power, as apparent mediator, acquires for the moment a certain inde-
pendence in relation to both. 
The State, therefore, has not existed from all eternity... [It] became a necessity be-
cause of [the cleavage of society into classes]. We are now rapidly approaching a 
stage in the development of production at which the existence of these classes... 
becomes a positive hindrance to production. They will fall as inevitably as they 
once arose. The State inevitably falls with them. The society which organizes pro-
duction anew on the basis of free and equal association of the producers will put 
the whole State machinery where it will then belong – into the museum of antiqui-
ties, next to the spinning wheel and the bronze ax. (WAMW/1884/origin-family/
ch09.htm)
Lenin then highlights Engels’s discussion in Anti-Dühring of the proletariat’s 
seizing political power and “turning the means of production into State property”:
But in doing this, it abolishes itself as proletariat, abolishes all class distinctions 
and class antagonisms, abolishes also the State as State... When at last it becomes 
the real representative of the whole of society, it renders itself unnecessary. As 
soon as there is no longer any social class to be held in subjection; as soon as class 
rule, and the individual struggle for existence based upon our present anarchy 
in production, with the collisions and excesses arising from these, are removed, 
nothing more remains to be repressed, and a special repressive force, a State, is 
no longer necessary. The first act in which the State really constitutes itself as the 
representative of society as a whole – this is, at the same time, its last indepen-
dent act as a State... The government of persons is replaced by the administration 
of things and the direction of processes of production. The State is not ‘abolished’, 
it withers away. (cited from the very slightly emended form used for Socialism: 
Utopian and Scientific, Tucker, ed.: 635)
Lenin clarifies and updates: “Engels speaks here of the proletarian revolution 
‘abolishing’ the bourgeois State, while the words about the State withering away re-
fer to the remnants of the proletarian State after the socialist revolution” (IP: 136). 
In between there would exist “the State... of the proletariat organized as the ruling 
class”, as Lenin approvingly cites (and underlines) from the Communist Manifesto 
(IP: 140). Seizing on Marx’s letter to Weydemeyer of March 5, 1852, he focuses 
on its words “that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat; [and] that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abo-
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lition of all classes and to a classless society”. Mindful of both the Tsarist and the 
World War legacy facing him, Lenin adds: “... this period [of transition] is inevita-
bly a period of unprecedented violent class struggle in unprecedented acute forms, 
and consequently, the State must inevitably be a State that is democratic in a new 
way (for the proletariat and the propertyless in general) and dictatorial in a new way 
(against the bourgeoisie)... The dictatorship of a single class is necessary... for the 
entire historical period which separates capitalism from ‘classless society’, from 
communism” (IP: 147-148).
Taking up Marx’s distinction between a first phase of communism and a higher 
one, Lenin believed that in the first or lower phase, ending private property of the 
means of production means that “the exploitation of man by man will have become 
impossible”, but that there will persist “the other injustice, which consists in the dis-
tribution of articles of consumption ‘according to the amount of labour performed’ 
(and not according to needs)... the inequality of ‘bourgeois right’”. He optimisti-
cally believed that injustice and the sway of bourgeois right will be ended by “[con-
verting the means of production] to common ownership”, while they will persist 
“in the distribution of products and the allotment of labour among the members of 
society” (IP: 189). Having explained that socialism is an incomplete communism, 
he boldly stated: “It follows that under communism there remains for a time not 
only bourgeois right but even the bourgeois State – without the bourgeoisie!” (IP: 
192). And for the first time (though relying on precedents possibly in German dis-
cussions) he noted that this phase is “commonly called ‘Socialism’” (IP: 188), and 
he proceeds to use it without the quotation marks; Stalin then, with his penchant for 
scholastic clarity, simplified and flattened this historical scheme into the two phases 
of “socialist society” and “communist society” (none of which has any bourgeois 
earmarks except, early on, the remnants of bourgeois property), whence it passed 
to all other CPs. 
It should be clear from the cited arguments and from Marx’s Civil War in 
France (also discussed at length, together with Engels’s 1891 Preface to it, IP: 175-
-179) what happens in such circumstances to the State mainstays, the armed forces 
and the bureaucracy. This is briefly summed up in Marx’s letter to Kugelman at the 
time of the Commune: “the bureaucratic-military machine [should be] broken, and 
this is the preliminary condition for every real people’s revolution on the continent” 
(IP: 150) – a statement which Lenin foregrounds as “the principal [task] of the pro-
letariat during a revolution in relation to the State”. To replace these twin pillars of 
class rule, “Instead of the special institutions of a privileged minority (privileged 
officialdom, the chiefs of the standing army), the majority itself can directly fulfil 
all these functions...” (IP: 153-154). The workers’ expropriation of the capitalists 
“must be exercised not by a State of bureaucrats, but by a State of armed workers” 
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(IP: 190 – reality showed Lenin then, after 1918, that this was too hasty a jump). 
His summation is twofold, beginning with a quasi-Rousseauist vision of the reason 
for bureaucratic alienation: 
Under capitalism democracy is restricted, cramped, mutilated, disfigured by all 
the conditions of wage slavery, of the masses’ distress and misery. This and this 
alone is the reason why the functionaries of our [social-democratic] political or-
ganizations and trade unions are corrupted – or more precisely, tend to be corrupt-
ed – by the capitalist condition, and betray a tendency to become bureaucrats, that 
is, privileged persons losing touch with the masses, standing above the masses. 
(IP: 205)
The workers, having conquered political power, will smash the old bureaucratic 
apparatus, they will shatter it to its very foundations, they will destroy it to the 
very roots, and they will replace it by a new one, consisting of the very same 
workers and office employees, against whose transformation into bureaucrats the 
measures specified in detail by Marx and Engels will at once be taken: 1) not only 
election but also recall at any time; 2) pay not exceeding that of a workman; 3) 
immediate introduction of control and supervision by all, so that all shall become 
‘bureaucrats’ for a time and, therefore, nobody may be able to become a ‘bureau-
crat’. (IP: 200)
To sum up, Lenin confidently believed in 1917 that the “large-scale produc-
tion, factories, railways, the postal service, telephones, etc.” created by capitalism 
has “so simplified [the great majority of the old ‘State power’ functions that they] 
can be reduced to such exceedingly simple operations of registration, filing, and 
checking [as are] easily performed by every literate person... for ordinary ‘work-
men’s wages’...” (IP: 154). This is true even when the revolution is made “by people 
as they are now, people who cannot dispense with subordination, control, and ‘fore-
men and bookkeepers’. // But the subordination must be to the armed vanguard of 
all the exploited and toiling people, that is, to the proletariat. A beginning can and 
must be made at once, overnight...” (IP: 158). His confidence was sorely tested after 
1918, but he might today wax even more optimistic in view of the PC, the internet, 
possibly two-way television, and similar.
However, Lenin shared Marx’s scathing dismissal of a “free State”. He cit-
ed approvingly Engels’s observation that freedom obtains when “the State as such 
ceases to exist” (IP: 185). No doubt, after the experiences of Hitler, Stalin, Pinochet, 
Pol Pot, and quite a lot of others in the century after The State and Revolution, even 
Marxists should undertake some additions to this very general long-range position, 
beginning with Lenin’s own later additions. 
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2.2. The Revolutionary Practice, 1918 on 
Soon after the 1917 October revolution, Lenin began to note with growing dismay 
the tendency of the necessary, and rapidly growing, State apparatus (gosapparat) to 
evolve modes of conduct incompatible with the revolutionary horizon. In particular, 
while acknowledging and strongly stressing the need for centralization of all efforts 
in order for the revolution to survive, he inveighed against the de facto disposses-
sion of the soviets of the working people, which were theoretically supposed to run 
the new country from top to bottom as the real power-holders or dictators. At his 
instigation, and probably with a good deal of support from the ranking cadres and 
even more by the file of the Bolshevik Party, many supposedly binding resolutions 
of the CP congresses and decisions of its leading bodies were passed – but then in 
practice disregarded. “[T]he general tendency [of the Party center] was to bureau-
cratization – which would later increase its ‘monolithic’ character... The process 
was that of the transformation of a political party into a State apparatus” (Lewin, 
1975: 126; cf. also 22-23). Lenin bitterly fought “the metamorphosis of the soviets 
into State organizations” (IP: 361), remarked how such a united Party/State ma-
chine was acquiring an independent and dominant momentum, yet for all his fre-
quent denunciations admitted that no remedy for this evil was at hand.5
From the very beginning in 1918, at the 7th CP Congress and the struggle 
against financial collapse, Lenin noted that the State power as then constituted was 
not truly proletarian, but exercised by a vanguard party, so that it was necessary “to 
protect the material and spiritual interests of the... proletariat from that very same 
State power”, allotting this role largely to the trade unions (CW 32: 20-24; B 1: 98-
-99). In his important speech at the 8th CP congress in 1919 (CW 29: 182-183; B 1: 
330), Lenin rightly coupled the “bureaucratic deviation” (uklon) or “bureaucratism” 
with the absence of “mass participation from below in Soviet rule”, attributed it to 
the infiltration of the indispensable tsarist and “bourgeois-exploitative” specialists, 
and lamented both their low level and the lack of “cultured forces” that would allow 
to kick them out (IP: 431 and 432). A deviation means, in the imaginative geogra-
phy of this discourse, a serious wrong turning, which can nevertheless still be recti-
fied (Trotsky’s post-exile diagnosis is based on this concept). The party programme 
5 In 1951, Boris Kidrič, the best Yugoslav CP theoretician, noted that, after the October Revolu-
tion, “There began the great drama of Lenin’s ceaseless conflict with bureaucratism, which he 
was objectively unable to eradicate, but he had in his quality of revolutionary and Marxist on the 
one hand to fight them and on the other – in the given situation – to strengthen them; this drama 
of the Russian revolutionaries ended in a tragedy” (1979: 140-141). 
It should be mentioned that in the age of mass organization bureaucracy already in 1891 
numbered 0.75 million members in the USA, 1.5 million in France and 1 million in the U.K. 
(Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, 1966: 183), and these numbers swelled hugely in all major States 
up to, and especially during, World War I and after it.
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adopted at that congress devoted a paragraph to the “struggle... for the complete 
eradication of this evil”, in three points: “1. Every member of a soviet must under-
take some definite work in the administrative service”; 2. There must be continu-
ous rotation in that work; “3. By degrees, the whole working population must be 
induced to take turns in the administrative service” (Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, 
1966: 383).
However, as the Civil War practically pulverized the Russian working class, 
and reduced the city population of Moscow by half and of Petrograd by 2/3, in mid-
-1920 new accents began to appear. Lenin had a confidential survey conducted in 
a major Soviet institution: from its 1,500 employees there were 900 from the old 
intelligentsia, 250 from the working class, and ca. 300 from the quondam bour-
geois, landowners, clerics or high tsarist officials (Lewin, 1988: 227-228). At the 
9th CP congress, Lenin boldly reiterated that the Soviet State was not a proletarian 
one, but a workers’ and peasants’ State with a bureaucratic distortion. In the booklet 
against ‘Left-Wing’ Communism, an Infantile Sickness, he underlined that the “hu-
man material made by capitalism”, including the proletarians, imported “its own 
petty-bourgeois prejudices” into the administration and into the communist party: 
“Within the Soviet engineers, within the Soviet teachers, within the privileged, i.e. 
the most qualified... workers in Soviet factories, we see constantly reborn all the 
negative traits of bourgeois [careerism, vulgar philistine routine..., national chau-
vinism, etc.]” (IP: 623-624). Towards the end of 1920, he harked back to his radical 
anti-State proposal of 1917 by declaring: “It is the task of the Soviet government 
to completely destroy the old machinery of State, as it was destroyed in October 
[1917] and to transfer power to the soviets” (CW 31: 421; B 1: 331). 
Thus, when, in On the Tax in Kind of May 1921, he asked what were the eco-
nomic roots of bureaucracy, he found no real answer beside pointing to pre-capi-
talist peasant backwoods, economic collapse, and grave lack of cultural know-how 
(IP: 701-702 and 705; CW 32: 335ff). Or, three months later, to “the trivial round 
(obydenshchina) of economics in a country of smallholders... and the elementary 
petty-bourgeois force (stikhiia) which surrounds us like air and mightily penetrates 
into the ranks of the proletariat” (IP: 722-723).
By January 1922, his theses on the new role of the trade unions identified the 
existing power as a “transitional type of proletarian State”, in which a proletarian 
class struggle, including strikes, had to obtain against both the capitalist appetites 
and “all sorts of survivals of the old capitalist system in the government offices” 
(CW 33: 187; B 1: 330); regardless of the old, somewhat oversimplified tag of 
“capitalist system”, that meant the class enemy was now partly inside the govern-
ment apparatus! All through the year, he poured his most acerbic scorn on the “So-
viet bureaucrat”. Thus in a letter to Sheinman in February 1922 he acidly noted: “At 
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present the State Bank is a bureaucratic power game. There is the truth for you, if 
you want to hear not the sweet communist-official lies (with which everyone feeds 
you as a high mandarin), but the truth. And if you do not want to look at this truth 
with open eyes, through all the communist lying, you are a man who has perished 
in the prime of life in a swamp of official lying” (CW 36: 567). And in his March 
report to the 11th CP congress, he emphasized that the economic dangers were much 
stronger than the past military ones “because the difficulty lies within ourselves... 
This difficulty consists in the fact that we do not want to acknowledge this unpleas-
ant truth imposed upon us, we do not want to get into the unpleasant position which 
is yet indispensable: start learning anew.” He concluded by taking the example of 
the Moscow communists in the administrative machine and asking whether they led 
the bureaucratic machine for which they were responsible: “To tell the truth, they do 
not lead, they are led” (IP: 765 and 774). 
Lenin sketched two mutually reinforcing explanations for this danger, which 
was for him on a par with the foreign encirclement and the internal petty bourgeoi-
sie (mainly peasant). One was cultural backwardness, and the other remnants of the 
tsarist past. At the end of 1922, addressing the 4th congress of the Comintern, he 
largely identified the Bolshevik “machinery of State” with the old tsarist one: 
We now have a vast army of government employees, but lack sufficiently educa-
ted forces to exercise real control over them. In practice it often happens that here 
on the top, where we exercise political power, the machine functions somehow, 
but down below, the government employees have arbitrary control, and they often 
exercise it to counteract our measures... (IP: 805; CW 33: 428-429; see also CW 
36: 605-606; B 1: 330-331 and 490-493)
But furthermore, he began to complain that the coercive apparatus of the sup-
posedly proletarian dictatorship and its core CP members were themselves trans-
formed by the exercise of power in the ruthless circumstances of economic collapse 
and civil war 1917-1921. The best contemporary short approach to Lenin concludes 
that “The new enemy acquired a bitterly ironical label: the ‘soviet bureaucrat’...”, 
and that he found the reason for this grave devolution in “the cultural deficit of the 
proletariat and (even more) of the [people]”, by which he meant literacy, elementary 
habits of organization, and other basic skills of modern ‘civilization’” (Lih, 2011: 
182-183). Discussing at the 11th CP congress some émigré circles who believed the 
Soviet rule was sliding toward a bourgeois rule, he even warned: “Let us talk open-
ly, such matters are possible... [T]he struggle with capitalist society has become a 
hundred times fiercer and more dangerous, because we do not always clearly see 
whether in front of us there stands an enemy or a friend” (IP: 773). Lenin was thus, 
before his incapacitation and then death, haltingly coming to approximate Rosa 
Luxemburg’s 1918 critique of the Russian Revolution (which she supported) as too 
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Jacobin and dictatorial in the bourgeois sense, so that eventually, with the fading vi-
tality of the soviets and other public or plebeian institutions, “only the bureaucracy 
remains as the active element” (Luxemburg, 1940: 47). 
I have not been proposing here to give a balanced assessment of Lenin’s theory, 
especially of his exile and underground phase culminating in The State and Revolu-
tion, since my aim is to identify the parts which were to remain in the tradition as 
mediated by Stalinism and handed down to the Yugoslav CP. It remains a fact that 
grave economic and then political difficulties caused Lenin to veer back to State 
power, however restricted its actual class basis was. In particular, the (originally 
temporary) prohibition of factions in the CP at its 10th congress in 1921 proved to 
be a grave mistake, opening the door for a slide to Stalinist autocracy. It would be 
fair to retroactively note that he had not yet understood the danger (but only the 
advantages) of monolithism. Furthermore, his fear from 1922 that an open split in 
the leadership might lead to the break-up of the CP means that he kept the struggle 
secret and only within the Politbureau (for a long time Trotsky would do this too). 
Thus, Marx’s idea that the radically anti-State Paris Commune type of institution 
provides “the... medium in which the class struggle can run through its different 
phases in the most rational and humane way”, because it “begins the emancipation 
of labour... by doing away with the unproductive and mischievous work of the State 
parasites” (1971: 149-150), vanished after 1922 from the USSR agenda. 
The resulting tradition arose as a balancing act by Stalin, who was in a cleft 
stick in dealing with Lenin’s legacy (see the excellent passage in Kidrič, 1949: 153-
-154). On the one hand, given the continuing prestige, at home and abroad, of the 
founder of the party and State, he necessarily had to continue propagating Lenin’s 
work. He draped himself in the mantle of his faithful disciple and indeed only con-
tinuator (the rest, from Trotsky and Bukharin on, were killed and their work in part 
tacitly appropriated by Stalin and fully expunged from the official doctrine). Fur-
thermore, there were large swatches in Lenin, beginning with the theory and es-
tablishment of the party and culminating in his insistence on a strong central State, 
which could, with suitable extrapolation out of the original situation and misinter-
pretation, be used in the Stalinist vulgate. On the other hand, some of his work did 
not fit and was subjected to various types of falsification, from a number of outright 
suppressions (cf. Medvedev, 1980: 556), as in the case of his anti-Stalin “Testa-
ment”, to editorial tricks, for example muddling the horizon of his copious notes 
on Hegel, which stressed that contradiction reigns in every process and there is no 
final victorious harmony, by adding to it some other unimportant writings on vari-
ous philosophers so that the volume could then be called Philosophical Notebooks, 
rather than Notes on Hegel or Notes on Dialectics. Most important, the unsuitable 
works were backgrounded, edited late and in small numbers, and expunged from 
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any official syllabus for the communist parties of the USSR or of the 3rd Interna-
tional. Characteristically, in A Short Course of the CPSU/b/ History – which was, 
together with Stalin’s Questions of Leninism, as it were the New Testament of the 
world communist movement – all the major works by Lenin are glossed, except 
State and Revolution!
In this complex negotiation, however, beside a dominant cold-stream Lenin us-
able for Stalinism there remained an irreducible core with the horizon of a radical 
soviet-type democracy that had already been published in the first 10 years of the 
USSR and could not now be censored outright. When read with discerning and in-
terested eyes, as in the Yugoslav post-1948 debates (the translation of The State and 
Revolution was published there by Winter 1947-1948), this horizon of Lenin’s testi-
fied to his difference from official crudely hierarchical Stalinism not simply by the 
quality of his texts but also by its “warm stream” horizon of liberatory Marxism. 
3. Stalin’s Unavowed Thermidor 
In this section I shall follow the USSR developments between roughly 1922 and 
1929, by which time the Stalinist social system had, for all the subsequent convul-
sions in the countryside and the upper reaches, acquired its permanent lineaments.
The most cruel Civil War 
brought about a deep trauma in the history of bolshevism and communism... The 
Civil War was the triumph of a most terrible and primitive violence of arms and 
men, a flagrant contradiction of the fundamental ideas from the October Revolu-
tion, and it perpetuated what those ideas were supposed to bury forever... Hav-
ing barely survived this ordeal, the CP came out of it exhausted, the soviets were 
emptied out, the working class of the two 1917 revolutions dispersed. And there 
clearly appeared a gap between the movement from below and the decimated and 
bureaucratized vanguards; revolutionary discipline had largely been supplanted 
by war mentality, by the conditions of dire need, by corruption. (Cortesi, 2010: 
303-304)
The CP and State apparatus grew more and more powerful to cope with the 
huge demands of war and the accompanying economic breakdown. As an exam-
ple, in 10 months between April 1920 and February 1921, the Uchraspred, a non-
-elected body assigning CP members to important tasks, made 40,000 assignments 
to important bodies (B 1: 304 citing Shapiro, 1970: 253). Stalin was elected gene-
ral secretary of the CP central committee (further CC) in March 1922, and during 
Lenin’s ensuing illness proceeded to a full-scale top-down reorganization of the CP 
and Soviet State apparatus, practically merging and hugely inflating them, and ri-
gidly subjecting them not to the CC nor its elected Organisation Bureau, but directly 
to the Secretariat. This hugely increased the powers and material privileges of the 
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apparatus members, giving them a strong incentive for clientelism: compared to the 
average monthly salary of under 7 rubles, it instituted an official minimum of 30 
roubles, while CC members received 43 roubles; with a bonus of 50% for CP func-
tionaries with a family of three, and another 50% for extraordinary work, the lowest 
apparatchik (professional CP functionary) had a standard of living which I would 
calculate as 8 times the average. All of them had also free housing, clothing, medical 
aid, and in the higher echelons transport (eventually to become office limousines). 
On top of it, at that time of dearth such functionaries received regular distribution in 
kind of meat, sugar, rice, tea, cigarettes, etc. The criterion, as formulated by Stalin 
at the 12th CP congress in 1923, was to select such cadre so that “posts will be taken 
by people capable of following the [Party] line” (another new Stalinist shibboleth, 
alongside “monolithism”, which became Stalin’s obsessive catchword, extolled in a 
key speech on industrialization in 1928 – B 2: 539). By 1923, the number of func-
tionaries paid by the Secretariat was over 20,000, with 40,000 further “technical 
staff”, also with special emoluments (the CP had then 400,000 members).6 Perhaps 
as important, the “CC instructors” to the provincial CP committees were given al-
most unlimited powers to steer the work of and the elections to those bodies, so that 
by that year about half of the provincial secretaries were already elected on “re-
commendation” of the Secretariat. Lenin’s ideal practice of a democracy from be-
low upward was thus erased, the soviets were practically powerless after 1921, and 
elections in the CP were in most – later all – important cases rigged in advance (all 
data in this paragraph from Podsheldolkin [1989?]).
During Stalin’s rise to dominance, his calls for “reconstructing the State appa-
ratus” zigzagged between ritual repetitions of tags from Lenin and anodyne calls “to 
make [the apparatus] sound and honest, simple and inexpensive” (B 2: 367-368). 
In the speech to the 8th congress of the Communist Youth League, Stalin called for 
mass control from below, especially against “the new bureaucrats... and finally, 
communist bureaucrats”, and for the party’s “ruthless struggle against bureaucracy” 
(B 2: 224-226). The 16th CP conference of April 1929 even put on its agenda “the 
fight against bureaucracy”, and passed a resolution criticizing the “bureaucratic per-
version of the State machinery”, asking that this machinery be improved in order 
to accomplish the Five-Year Plan, stressing “precise execution of their respective 
tasks by each link in the chain” and “overcoming inertia, red tape, bureaucratic sup-
pression, mutual ‘covering-up’ and indifference to the need of the working people” 
(B 2: 435-436). The theme was soon buried by a management counter-offensive 
6 At that time, Trotsky began to speak of the danger of “bureaucratic degeneration”, later his 
central diagnosis; in exile, he called the ruling bureaucracy a caste and not a class. Important as 
this pioneering – though to my mind insufficient – insight is, it was edited out of the Stalinist 
tradition, so I shall not deal with it here. 
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(B 2: 230), even if it was to periodically recur. Confusingly, Stalin’s purges, and 
later recurrent police persecutions, at times also cut into the bureaucracy, probably 
because it still had many members from Lenin’s time, and then because no group 
should feel safe (Lewin, 1981: 32-33). The situation is well characterized by an 
anecdote about Brecht’s attitude to it: he struck a penitent pose, squinted, and said 
(impersonating the State), “I know I should die out”... However, Stalin’s preferred 
means, increased violence by the State, issued in a new doctrine of “intensified 
class struggle”, justifying most cruel and sweeping repressions: it was announced 
in a speech in July 1928 (see Davies, 1980: 598-599), repeated in 1933, and in 1939 
led eventually, after his complete victory, into a head-on denial of the “rotten” anti-
-State axiom of Marx’s and Engels’s (see McNeal, 1980: 62). 
In spite of oscillations and manoeuverings, bureaucracy thus principally meant 
in Stalinism what impeded the further centralization, expansion, and smooth work 
of the oligarchic and despotic State machinery, that is, paper-pushing or what the 
French call la paperasserie, and this remained its official meaning until the end of 
the Soviet regime. Nonetheless, it was useful not only for disciplining subordinates 
in the apparatus, but also in giving a hint to the workers and peasants that the top 
was aware of their oppression and working against its bearers. This last aspect was 
closely watched so as not to give too much scope to the “culturally and technically 
backward” masses, and never allowed to coalesce except as a movement for “so-
cialist emulation” and Stakhanovite work productivity. True, Bukharin was as late 
as in 1929 still allowed to criticize the distended State apparatus, which he linked 
with increasing pressure on the peasants, and to call for “all possible forms of as-
sociation by working people so as, at all costs, to avoid bureaucratisation”. Since 
all this hinged on the role of the Bolshevik Party, he also took aim at its blind dis-
cipline, exhorting members, in the critical tradition of Lenin, “to take not a single 
word on trust... to utter not a single word against their conscience”. But this was the 
swan-song of the original Marx-to-Lenin line: soon, Bukharin was to be denounced 
by the Stalinists for bowing to “the backwardness and discontent of the masses” and 
infringing the necessary “iron discipline” in the party (B 2: 424 and 486; Cohen, 
1973: 304), and definitely silenced. 
A further rough indication about bureaucracy could be gleaned from the com-
position of the CP. In its 1927 census it had one million members, of whom the “of-
fice workers and others” – the latter were mainly students – occupied fully 60% as 
against 30% of the workers (B 2: 334-335 and 350-351). True, later a huge drive 
was launched to get a “workers’” majority in the party; but the definitions of social 
provenience were vague and mainly based on unchecked declarations by the mem-
bers who had an incentive to claim virtuous working-class ascendancy. It seems 
that in most cases membership in the CP was in personal union with the official or 
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“bureaucratic” post one filled. The bureaucracy grew into “a social stratum which 
led a life different from that of the workers in the factories and the fields, arrogated 
privileges to itself, and was unaware of the real problems faced by the masses” (B 
2: 336). The 1939 USSR census found that, including families, 14 million people 
were clerical workers or professionals employed by the State, 3.5 times as many – 
10 million more – than in 1926 (McNeal, 1980: 59-60). At the time, Stalin claimed 
that, of almost 3.5 million CP members, there were 3-4 thousand “superior” leaders 
or executives, 30-40 thousand middle ones, and 100-150 thousand members of “the 
lower Party leadership” (ibidem: 46; the first two were usually called krupnyand 
gosudarstvennyand deiatel’ and otvet-rabotnik – Lewin, 1981: 32). 
It is therefore not too surprising that in the backward USSR Stalin’s course was 
not without mass support in the CP and the country, including the reconstituted in-
dustrial workers (of whom 8% were CP members – see B 2: 338-340). He appealed 
first to stability, a modest but clear rise of the overall living standard in comparison 
to the years of collapse, the longing for peace which dominated a people that had 
gone through seven years of war and civil war, and later to the interest of the new 
dominant class to build “socialism in one country” (that is, industrialization and 
modernization which would preserve the existing oligarchy) in the USSR. The so-
cial system of ripe Stalinism from the 1930s on was “a hierarchy, but with ample 
opportunities of upward mobility” (McNeal, 1980: 57). The price to pay for this 
was to become very high: it began with “the confiscation sine die of the elementary 
liberties of political expression, of gathering, of knowledge, of travel, of personal 
adventurous freedom” (Cortesi, 2010: 725) as well as of strikes, and ended in mass 
assassinations and/or incarcerations of entire social groups. Politically, it consist-
ed in the rise of a ruling stratum or class no longer in feedback with the masses: 
concerning the peasants, this disjuncture was true from the October Revolution on 
and moderated only by Lenin’s insistence on safeguarding their interests and their 
monopoly on food production; concerning the industrial working class, it became 
largely true since its reconstitution in the roughly five years after Lenin’s death, 
after the old revolutionary core had been decimated, and the workers in the party 
“were very quickly absorbed into the various apparatuses, so that they left the work-
ing class” (B 2: 517). Economically, it was based on rapid industrialization and a 
scarcity of consumer goods. As Trotsky satirically remarked:
The basis of bureaucratic rule is the poverty of society in objects of consumption, 
with the resulting struggle of each against all. When there is enough goods in a 
store, the purchasers can come whenever they want to. When there is little goods, 
the purchasers are compelled to stand in line. When the lines are very long, it is 
necessary to appoint a policeman to keep order. Such is the starting point of the 
power of the Soviet bureaucracy. It “knows” who is to get something and who has 
to wait. (1936, ch05.htm)
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It meant that the 1919 1:5 ratio of minimum to maximum incomes grew in the 
1930s to between 1:10 and 1:12 (Nove, 1982: 212), not counting the top apparatus, 
while in 1950 it was 1:40 (Ossowski, 1966: 130). At the peak of this High Stalinism, 
the bureaucratic material privileges, superadded to those of authority and prestige, 
were huge: top people (including privileged artists) could use secret special shops 
with generally unavailable goods: the lowest bureaucrats had to pay for them, the 
middle ones paid only half, while the top echelons had unlimited free drawing rights 
(Mandel, 1968: 8). To the contrary, the living standard of the workers, in particular, 
was subject as of the beginning of Five-Year plans to a sharp reduction in favour 
of State accumulation, only partly due to the great influx into towns and industries 
(see Cliff, 1948; ch04-a.htm#s0). As to the intelligentsia, when Gorky urged Lenin 
to institute an alliance of the workers with the intellectuals, he is reported to have 
replied: “This is not a bad idea, not at all. Tell the intelligentsia it should join us” 
(Fischer, 1970 1: 415). But the majority remained inimical; the powerfully creative 
humanist minority which did join in was as a tolerated epicycle, as of the end of the 
1920s subject to strong control by bureaucratic organizations and then beheaded in 
the 1930s. However, natural sciences and a streamlined educational system were as 
of the first Five-Year plans strongly fostered. A new, subservient intellectual class 
became the subordinate administrative and technical elite (Stalin, as usual, called it 
a “stratum” – McNeal, 1980: 58).
To sum up sections 2 and 3 about the USSR, I shall use citations from two of the 
most important books in the field. 
A general conclusion would be Cortesi’s take, in the best and richest survey to 
date, that the Thermidor “shaped an autocratic State, with a growing distance from 
the 1917 revolutionary ideas” (2010: 737).
On bureaucracy in particular, Bettelheim’s conclusion is:
Lenin too used the expressions ‘bureaucracy’ and ‘bureaucratic distortion’, but 
what is important is that he did not rest satisfied with these elements of analysis 
or of description, but strove to relate them to class relations and the class struggle. 
For almost all the CP members, including the leaders, however, the expressions 
‘bureaucracy’ and ‘bureaucratic distortion’ served as substitutes for class analy-
sis... Consequently, the fight against these phenomena seemed not to be primarily 
a question of class struggle, but to depend exclusively on the development of the 
productive forces, of education, or of repression. (B 1: 516-517)
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